China’s engagement with Syria has long been characterized by pragmatism rather than passion. The recent fall of Bashar al-Assad, culminating in the takeover of Damascus by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), marks a turning point for Beijing’s Middle East strategy. While Syria’s significance in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been overstated, Assad’s ouster brings new challenges and opportunities for China’s regional aspirations.
China-Syria relations: A decade of cautious alignment
China’s relationship with Syria under Assad evolved within the framework of limited yet calculated support. Beijing’s involvement, unlike the military and financial commitments of Russia and Iran, focused on diplomatic backing and selective economic engagement. Notably, China leveraged its veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on ten occasions to shield Assad from sanctions and condemnations. These moves aligned with China’s principle of opposing regime change, rooted in fears of external interference setting precedents for its domestic governance.
In practice, China’s financial contributions to Syria have been modest compared to other allies. According to the Geopolitical Monitor, Chinese investments and construction contracts in Syria totaled $4.6 billion, all initiated before the civil war. In contrast, Iran poured an estimated $30 to $50 billion into propping up Assad’s regime. Furthermore, China’s pledges often lacked follow-through; for instance, a $2 billion aid promise in 2017 remains unfulfilled, as noted by The Diplomat.
China’s economic support increased slightly after key victories by Assad’s forces. Following the Syrian army’s retaking of Aleppo in 2016, Beijing ramped up its aid, which jumped 100-fold to $54 million in 2017, according to the Al Jazeera. This aid primarily included non-lethal assistance, such as generators for the Latakia port. However, its impact paled compared to Western humanitarian assistance. In 2023 alone, the United States provided $2 billion, dwarfing China’s contributions over the past decade.
Syria in the Belt and Road Initiative: A peripheral node
Syria’s purported centrality to China’s Belt and Road Initiative has often been overstated. Claims of Latakia’s port being a critical maritime node remain speculative at best. While Syria joined the BRI in 2022, investments have been limited, partly due to fears of secondary U.S. sanctions. According to the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker, Chinese investments in Syria’s oil and gas sector predate the BRI, and no major post-war infrastructure projects have been initiated.
Although some projects, such as the construction of a photovoltaic plant near Homs, suggest potential avenues for future collaboration, they are marginal compared to China’s broader BRI engagements in neighboring regions. Countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have absorbed billions in Chinese investments, emphasizing their greater importance to Beijing’s Middle East strategy.
The fall of Assad: Costs and recalibrations for China
Assad’s fall has undeniable implications for China, though these may not be as catastrophic as initially assumed. Three primary areas of impact stand out:
Diplomatic setback
China’s alignment with Assad was a calculated move to strengthen its diplomatic presence in the Middle East. Hosting Assad in Hangzhou in 2023 and signing a strategic partnership were symbolic steps to bolster China’s narrative as a broker of stability, as seen in its mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Assad’s ouster disrupts this narrative, exposing China’s limited leverage in conflict zones.
Security concerns
The HTS-led victory raises security alarms for Beijing, particularly regarding the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uyghur separatist group operating in Syria. The Diplomat highlights that TIP fighters—estimated at over 5,000—gained combat experience in Syria, posing potential threats to China’s Xinjiang region. While their return to China remains improbable, Beijing fears their influence could spread to Afghanistan and Pakistan, destabilizing projects like the $65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Economic repercussions
The immediate economic impact on China appears limited, given Syria’s minor role in the BRI. However, regional instability could spill over into neighboring countries with significant Chinese investments. Critical maritime chokepoints like the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, essential for Chinese trade and energy shipments, may face heightened risks.
A pragmatic path forward
China’s history of cautious engagement suggests a measured response to Assad’s fall. Beijing is likely to wait for Syria’s new leadership to stabilize before pursuing further investments or diplomatic overtures. Lessons from China’s engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan may offer guidance. Despite initial hostilities, Beijing was the first to recognize a Taliban diplomat in 2023, signaling its willingness to adapt to new realities if strategic interests are at stake.
For China, the loss of Assad does not spell the end of its Middle East ambitions. Instead, it underscores the importance of diversification and resilience in its foreign policy. As noted by Geopolitical Monitor, China’s investments in regional heavyweights like Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain robust, suggesting a shift in focus toward more stable partners.