KEY TAKEAWAYS
- Strategic foundations: Türkiye and Israel maintained a strategic partnership from the early 1990s to the late 2000s, rooted in shared perceptions of Syria as a security threat.
- Geopolitical dynamics: The Turkish-Israeli axis (north-south) counterbalanced the Iran-Syria alliance (east-west), driven by territorial disputes and militant threats (Hezbollah, PKK).
- Deterioration and renewal: Relations soured post-2010 (Gaza War, Mavi Marmara incident) but began improving by 2021, with diplomatic visits in 2022 and 2023.
- Impact of Syrian war: The 2011 Syrian conflict provided an opening for Türkiye-Israel rapprochement, although at the time Türkiye aligned with Iran and Russia.
- Strategic outcomes: The collapse of Assad’s Syria signalled the temporary success of the Turkish-Israeli axis over Iran-Syria, but ongoing volatility may lead to renewed rivalry—or cooperation.
Editorial note: This forms part of a cluster of four interrelated GeoTrends analyses; one on the fall of Syria, and one on post-Assad Turkish-Israeli tensions, by Sotiris Mitralexis; one on the ascendancy of Saudi Arabia’s and generally the Gulf Arab States’ importance as a result of recent geopolitical developments, by Dimitris B. Peponis, and this analysis below on the recent historical background of Turkish-Israeli relations as a lens for understanding Syria:
This analysis examines the fall of the Assad regime in Syria through the framework of Türkiye-Israel relations. While this perspective provides valuable insights, it is not the primary, dominant, or exclusive means of understanding the collapse of Ba’athist Syria. Different analytical frameworks can yield varying interpretations of the same event, similar to how changing methods of analysis can lead to new conclusions or the discovery of different dynamics.
A comprehensive approach to understanding the fall of Assad’s Syria requires weighing local factors (such as the relationships between Arabs, Turks, Iranians, and Kurds within Syrian territory), regional dynamics (including the interactions between Damascus, Tehran, Moscow, Ankara, Tel Aviv, and the Gulf states), as well as international and global factors (such as the U.S.-Russia competition, the Ukraine War, and the Saudi-Iran rapprochement mediated by China). Historical contexts, such as Syria-Iran relations and the war on terror, must also be considered.
From the early 1990s until the late 2000s, Türkiye and Israel maintained a strategic partnership. This relationship was initially facilitated by the 1991 Madrid Conference, which marked the beginning of direct peace negotiations between Israelis and Arabs. Subsequent agreements, including the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords and the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, further solidified this foundation. Prior to Madrid, Egypt was the only Arab nation engaging in direct talks with Israel. The shifting diplomatic environment created favourable conditions for the deepening of Türkiye-Israel relations.
The geopolitical foundation for Turkish-Israeli cooperation was a shared perception of Syria as a security threat. This mutual concern centred on two key issues: territorial disputes and state-sponsored militancy. Türkiye’s dispute with Syria over the Hatay province and Israel’s conflict over the Golan Heights both stemmed from post-World War I arrangements under the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, the Assad regime’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê – PKK) in Türkiye exacerbated these tensions. The Turkish-Israeli strategic axis, running north to south, sought to balance the informal but strategic alliance between Iran and Syria, which extended east to west.
Despite a period of tension during Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s tenure due to his outreach to Iran, the Turkish military ensured the continuity of Türkiye’s pro-Western foreign policy. This led to Erbakan’s resignation through the so-called “post-modern coup” of 1997, followed by the banning of his Welfare Party and his exclusion from politics. The goal was to preserve Türkiye’s Western orientation.
The strategic partnership between Türkiye and Israel peaked between 1996 and 2001, following two key defence and security agreements signed in 1996. However, this relationship began to unravel between 2008 and 2010 due to two major incidents: the 2008-2009 Gaza War (Operation Cast Lead) and the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, where an Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla resulted in the deaths of Turkish activists.
After 2010, diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Israel deteriorated, military cooperation ceased, and Türkiye under Erdoğan pursued closer ties with Hamas, which shares ideological roots with Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) through the Muslim Brotherhood (Society of the Muslim Brothers).
The outbreak of the Syrian war in 2011, which evolved from a civil conflict into a regional proxy war, created new opportunities for Türkiye-Israel rapprochement. Both Ankara and Tel Aviv opposed the Assad regime and Iran’s involvement in Syria. However, Türkiye’s strategic pivot towards Iran and Russia by 2016 precluded meaningful Turkish-Israeli cooperation in Syria at that time.
By 2021, Türkiye-Israel relations began to improve. In 2022, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Türkiye, and in 2023, Netanyahu and Erdoğan met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, 2023 saw renewed tensions due to Erdogan’s denunciation of Israel’s nuclear program and the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel, which triggered the largest Gaza conflict to date.
Within the context of Türkiye-Israel relations, the collapse of Assad’s Syria reflects the eventual triumph of the Turkish-Israeli axis (north-south) over the Iran-Syria axis (east-west) in Syrian territory. This outcome stands independently of the subjective motivations or intentions of the actors involved.
The fall of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq facilitated the emergence of a limited but significant Iranian sphere of influence stretching from the Zagros Mountains through the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to Lebanon. This development brought Iran and Israel into direct geopolitical confrontation. Similarly, the collapse of Assad’s Syria and the fragmentation of Iran’s sphere of influence in the Levant—particularly from Lebanon’s mountain ranges to northern Syria—may lead to one of two outcomes: the establishment of a Türkiye-Israel sphere of influence or a direct confrontation between Türkiye and Israel within Syria.
While the fall of Assad’s Syria has reshaped the strategic landscape changing the balance of power in Syria and the Levant, moving forward, pragmatic diplomacy and strategic recalibration will be essential. Both Türkiye and Israel must navigate their interests carefully to avoid conflict and explore avenues for cooperation, particularly in the context of a fragmented and volatile Middle East.
* Dimitris B. Peponis holds an MA in Governance and Public Policies from the University of the Peloponnese’s Department of Political Science and International Relations and is the author of “The End of the Great Deviation: From Ukraine and the Pandemic to the Shaping of the New Global Order” (Topos books, in Greek).