Armenia at the crossroads: TRIPP, Zangezur and the New Geoeconomics of the Caucasus

Armenia stands at the center of a geopolitical chessboard that goes far beyond its borders. Paul E. Kent’s study (From Blockade to Bridge: TRIPP, Zangezur, and the Economics of Connectivity in the Caucasus, 2025) examines how new transport corridors, such as TRIPP and Zangezur, promise to transform a landlocked country into a hub of connectivity.

Behind the kilometers of rail tracks, however, lie the strategies of the U.S., Türkiye, Russia, China, and Iran—with Greece having reasons to closely monitor developments.

The “punishment” of geography

Armenia is a classic example of a country paying the cost of geography. Without access to the sea, it depends almost exclusively on the northern corridor through Georgia and the Black Sea ports, mainly Poti. The result is enormous land costs: 800–1,000 kilometers of transport to reach the port, border delays, and seasonal difficulties.

As Kent’s study underlines, landlocked countries (LLDCs) face on average 70% higher trade costs than coastal states. In some cases, transport expenses alone equal 40% of export value. For an economy like Armenia’s, which seeks to enter global value chains, this translates into low competitiveness and high dependence on third parties.

It is not only about cost. The lack of predictability—delays at border crossings, weather-related obstacles, bureaucracy—pushes up insurance premiums, limits the possibility for just-in-time production, and makes exports vulnerable. As Kent notes, a shipment that theoretically takes three days can easily drag out to a full week.

TRIPP: The American ρesponse

Enter the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity). This corridor is designed to connect Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan enclave and from there with Türkiye, crossing the southern part of Armenia. The U.S. has secured exclusive development rights, giving the project not only economic but also strong political weight.

TRIPP’s promise is attractive: shorter distance, lower cost, greater reliability. The study estimates that a container could reach Germany in 7–10 days at a cost of $2,500–3,000, compared to $3,000–3,500 and 10–14 days via Georgia–Poti.

The challenge is that TRIPP is externally imposed. The question for Armenia is whether it can take advantage of the project without surrendering control over its sovereignty.

Zangezur: The Turkish strategy

At the same time, Türkiye is pushing forward the Zangezur Corridor, centered on the construction of the Kars–Nakhchivan line. The project is financed with €2.4 billion in “green funding” and is planned to handle 15 million tons of cargo annually.

Zangezur is not merely a commercial venture. It is part of Ankara’s broader strategy to consolidate its role as a “bridge” between the Caucasus and Europe, bypassing existing networks. For Türkiye, it means closer linkage with Azerbaijan, a stronger footprint in the South Caucasus, and greater geopolitical leverage.

Crossroads of peace: The Armenian answer

Faced with these external plans, Armenia has put forward its own initiative: the Crossroads of Peace Initiative (CPI). The aim is to ensure that infrastructure projects serve Armenian sovereignty, transparency, and balanced development.

The CPI operates as a “counterweight” to TRIPP, proposing new cross-border projects designed for Armenia’s long-term benefit rather than just for transit. Kent stresses that without the Armenian perspective at the table, the country risks being reduced to a passageway for others without reaping its own gains.

© The Government of Armenia

The case study: “Maria”

The most striking element of Kent’s study is a case study. “Maria,” logistics manager for a multinational with a factory in Yerevan, was tasked with finding the best way to ship a container worth $50,000 to Germany.

• Via Poti: 10–14 days, $3,000–3,500, medium reliability.
• Via TRIPP: 7–10 days, $2,500–3,000, expected reliability 75–80%.
• Via Iran: 20–25 days, over $4,500, low reliability.

Conclusion: Today, Poti remains the safest option, but TRIPP promises to radically alter the map.

International reactions

The study also reviews the positions of the major players:

• United States: Sees TRIPP as a tool for direct presence in the Caucasus.
• Türkiye: With Zangezur aims for commercial and political dominance.
• Azerbaijan: Gains access to Türkiye and Europe without reliance on Georgia or Iran.
• Iran: Opposes, seeing itself sidelined.
• Russia: Maintains diplomatic neutrality but views U.S. involvement with suspicion.
• China: Moves more quietly, investing in Georgia’s Anaklia port and in the North–South Corridor with Iran and Russia, creating parallel networks that could bypass Armenia.

The Greek dimension

For Greece, the lessons are multiple:

1. Ports and logistics: New corridors reshape cargo flows. Piraeus and Thessaloniki must leverage their geographic advantage to remain competitive hubs.
2. Alexandroupoli: Its emergence as an energy and strategic node makes it a crucial link in a map stretching from the Caucasus to the Eastern Mediterranean.
3. Shipping: Greek-owned fleets may benefit from new trade routes but also face exposure to geopolitical turbulence.
4. EU and geopolitics: The European Union must strengthen the competitiveness of its shipping and infrastructure or risk losing ground to the U.S., Türkiye, and China.

Kent’s study shows clearly that Armenia stands at a turning point. If the TRIPP and Zangezur corridors are implemented with respect for sovereignty and transparency, they can transform isolation into opportunity. If not, the country will remain a bystander in a race unfolding across its own territory.

For Greece, the “promise of connection” is a reminder that logistics are not just economics—they are diplomacy, geostrategy, and national security. Timely investment in ports, rail networks, and energy infrastructure could determine whether Greece remains a regional hub or whether new lines drawn further east will bypass it altogether.