Amidst the Syrian quagmire, a calculated detachment from global jihadism and the Muslim Brotherhood marks a new era. This strategic recalibration by a prominent figure aims to consolidate power, redefine alliances, and secure international legitimacy, reshaping the regional geopolitical landscape with stark pragmatism.
Once known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa is now recasting Islamist politics in Syria, pursuing international legitimacy and tightening his grip on power through calculated realpolitik.
The unveiling of a new persona
For too long, the Middle East has been a theatre of ideological purity, where rigid doctrines clashed with the cold, hard realities of power. Even the most fervent ideologues eventually discover that survival necessitates flexibility. This brings us to al-Sharaa, whose recent pronouncements, as highlighted in a recent video by Fehim Taştekin, a Turkish journalist and analyst specializing in Middle Eastern and Syrian affairs, suggest a profound, if cynical, embrace of Syrian Islamist Realpolitik. One might call it a pragmatic purge of inconvenient associations, designed to secure a more palatable future for his nascent authority.
The recent spectacle of al-Sharaa hosting media personalities was not merely a public relations exercise. It was a calculated effort to shed the burdensome cloak of his past. His adoption of his birth name, Ahmed al-Shara, is a transparent attempt to distance himself from the unsavoury associations of ISIS and Al-Qaeda. One can almost hear the collective sigh of relief from Western chancelleries, eager to find a ‘moderate’ among the myriad of unsavory characters in the Syrian conflict. This is, after all, the essence of Syrian Islamist Realpolitik: adapting one’s narrative to suit prevailing geopolitical winds.
Rhetoric and reality: The limits of ambition
Ahmed al-Sharaa’s assertion that his sole interest lies in changing the regime in Syria, rather than establishing an Islamic state, is a particularly exquisite piece of rhetorical gymnastics. It is a message crafted for external consumption, a subtle nod to those who might otherwise view him with suspicion. By limiting his ambitions geographically, he signals a decisive break from global jihadist ideology. This is a guarantee, he implies, to the international community—a promise that his ambitions do not extend beyond Syria’s borders. Such assurances, while perhaps disingenuous, are precisely what certain external powers crave, allowing them to justify their continued support for a figure who, not so long ago, was considered anathema.
The careful disavowal of ties to jihadist organizations and the emphatic denial of any connection to the Muslim Brotherhood or the Arab Spring are crucial elements of this new narrative. These are not mere semantic distinctions; they are strategic declarations designed to appease a diverse array of international actors. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, is viewed as a threat by several regional powers, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Syrian leader’s distancing himself from them is a shrewd move, designed to secure the backing of these influential Gulf states. The complexities of Syrian Islamist Realpolitik demand such nuanced maneuvering.
Internal consolidation and external appeasement
The internal dynamics within Syria also play a significant role in al-Sharaa’s strategic calculations. The Muslim Brotherhood, despite its claims of supporting a modern, political state, poses a potential threat to al-Sharaa’s burgeoning one-man rule. Their recent Shura Council statement, emphasizing political pluralism and rejecting despotism, was a direct challenge to his authority. Ahmed al-Sharaa, now positioning HTŞ as a de facto state, demands absolute compliance from former opposition forces. He expects them to adapt to his new structure and embrace his vision of a unified, authoritarian state. This is a clear manifestation of his Syrian Islamist Realpolitik, where dissent is not merely discouraged but actively purged.
His advisor, Ahmet Zeydan, calling for the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood, was a deliberate provocation. The fact that this call was amplified through Al Jazeera, a channel that has historically supported the Brotherhood, adds another layer of intrigue. Zeydan’s own controversial past only underscores the cynical pragmatism at play. This is not about ideological purity; it is about power consolidation. The Muslim Brotherhood’s lukewarm response, a promise to ‘monitor and warn,’ indicates their understanding of the precarious situation. Ahmed al-Sharaa, it seems, is leaving nothing to chance.
The new creed: Obedience and pragmatism
The ideological contortions required for this Syrian Islamist Realpolitik are truly remarkable. The cosmetic changes to HTŞ’s Salafist roots are not born of genuine ideological evolution but of strategic necessity. They are borrowing concepts from the Medhali school, a ‘peaceful Salafism’ that prioritizes obedience to authority. This is a convenient theological justification for authoritarian rule.
We have seen this pattern before: Salafists in Egypt legitimizing Sisi’s coup, supporting Khalifa Haftar in Libya, and aligning with Saudi–UAE forces in Yemen. It is a remarkably useful movement, Salafist but not jihadist, providing a veneer of religious legitimacy to purely political objectives. In Syria, the message is clear: obedience to the ruler is obligatory. This is the new creed of Syrian Islamist Realpolitik.
Regional repercussions and the Arab Spring legacy
The implications of this evolving strategy extend far beyond Idlib. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s calculated moves challenge the traditional understanding of Islamist movements, demonstrating a willingness to sacrifice ideological purity for political expediency. This pragmatic approach offers a tantalizing prospect for external actors weary of the unpredictable nature of global jihadism. The message is clear: a stable, albeit authoritarian, entity is preferable to chaotic extremism. This is a bitter pill for many to swallow, but it is a testament to the enduring power of realpolitik in a region defined by its brutal pragmatism.
One cannot overlook the role of regional powers in shaping this new reality. Türkiye, for instance, has a complex relationship with various Islamist factions in Syria. Ankara’s own evolving geopolitical interests, particularly its desire to normalize relations with Egypt, have led to a noticeable cooling of its enthusiasm for the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdoğan’s willingness to “show the door” to Egyptian Brotherhood members residing in Türkiye underscores this. This is not a moral stance, but a pragmatic one, driven by the cold calculus of national interest. The current allied structure in Qatar and Damascus, observing the process from afar, suggests a degree of tacit acceptance of al-Sharaa’s actions. For them, the consolidation of power, even under a figure like al-Sharaa, might be a necessary evil to prevent further destabilization.
The notion that al-Sharaa’s regime is not a continuation of the Arab Spring is also a crucial message. The Arab Spring, for all its initial promise, ultimately devolved into a series of devastating conflicts. By disavowing any connection to this tumultuous period, the Syrian leader seeks to present his rule as a new beginning. This narrative, while convenient, ignores the complex historical lineage of the Syrian conflict. Nevertheless, it is a narrative designed to appeal to a global audience eager for stability, even if that stability comes at the cost of democratic aspirations. The cynical truth is that many international players would prefer a strongman, however unsavory, to the unpredictable chaos of a genuine popular uprising.
Consolidation of power and future prospects
Ultimately, al-Sharaa’s project is a testament to the enduring power of authoritarianism in the Middle East. His systematic dismantling of potential opposition and his insistence on a singular, unchallenged authority are all hallmarks of a regime determined to secure its own survival. The ideological justifications serve merely as a veneer for a naked grab for power. The Medhali school, with its emphasis on obedience to the ruler, provides a convenient theological framework for this authoritarian consolidation. It is a chilling reminder that even in the name of religion, the pursuit of power often leads to the suppression of dissent.
The question remains: how long can this delicate act endure? Ahmed al-Sharaa’s efforts to present a more palatable image to the international community, while simultaneously consolidating his power through ruthless means, are fraught with inherent contradictions. The resentment of those he has purged, the lingering suspicions of external actors, and the inherent instability of a region perpetually on the brink, all pose significant challenges to his long-term viability.
Yet, for now, al-Sharaa’s strategy offers a glimpse into the future of Islamist movements: a future where pragmatism, however brutal, often trumps ideology, and where the pursuit of power dictates the terms of engagement. The stage is set for a new act in the Syrian tragedy, one where the lines between friend and foe are increasingly blurred. Only time will tell if this calculated move will secure his legacy, or if it will merely be another fleeting chapter in the region’s tumultuous history.